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The paper examines changes in the levels of efficiency as a result of privatisation in 
Pakistan. By comparing the growth rates of the privatised industries in pre- and post-
Privatisation period, changes in relative prices and the rate of return on equity, it 
concludes that producers may have indulged in monopolistic exploitation. The paper 
argues that even if the private firms have lower cost curves as compared to public sector 
at all the levels of output, at the equilibrium, public-sector firms may have lower cost. 
Accordingly, the regulation of the private monopoly, especially in the non-traded sector, 
is absolutely necessary. However, if regulation implies uncertainty and less flexibility to 
private sector firms, even compared with public sector enterprises, then regulated private-
sector firms would be counter-productive. It suggests that the perfect contest-ability 
model which allows the firm to make sufficient profits and leave them free to take the 
decisions will be a better alternative. The price caps in line with changes in productivity 
and the general inflation rates may be a more efficient intervention. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
That Pakistan has been able to divest 86 manufacturing units, two banks, one 
development financial institution, one thermal power unit, 12 percent share of 
Pakistan Telecommunication, and 10 percent shares of Pakistan International 
Airlines over the last five years and its intention to divest the remaining 
manufacturing enterprises, all banks and DFIs, thermal power stations of WAPDA, 
and tele-communications shows her commitment to privatisation. While divestiture 
has gone ahead at a rapid pace, its intended impact on fiscal deficit and levels of 
efficiency may have not been realised. As a matter of fact, Naqvi and Kemal (1991) 
had pointed out that just changes in the locus of ownership may not improve the 
levels of efficiency. Even more importantly Kemal (1993) and Naqvi and Kemal 
(1994, 1997) found a decline in output and an increase in the prices of products 
relating to the privatised industries. The evidence from other countries on impact of 
privatisation on efficiency is not conclusive. For example, Caves and Christensen 
(1980); CIDA (1987); Selim (1988); Yotopolous (1989); Foreman-Peck (1989); 
Edgren (1990); Vuylsteke (1989); Nankani (1989); Candoy-Sekse (1989); Kikeri, 
Nellis and Shirley (1992); Sen (1992) and Baumol (1996). The general conclusion 
emerging from these studies is that it is not the locus of ownership but the quality of 
management and market structure which determines the performance of a firm. 
That privatisation would lead to higher levels of efficiency is based on the 
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premise that survival of the private firms depends on cost minimisation while public 
sector firms may not be motivated enough to reduce their cost of production. That 
assumes perfectly competitive markets in which private sector is to operate and 
which are non-existent in Pakistan. Moreover, if government intends to privatise 
even those industries/activities where scale economies are rather significant then 
there is an imminent danger that private monopolies may substitute the public 
monopolies. The need is, therefore, obvious to analyse Pakistan’s privatisation 
experience with respect to growth in output, efficiency and prices and to examine the 
possibilities of regulating the industries so that a competitive solution in the private 
sector monopolies is ensured. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. After this introductory section, the impact 
of privatisation on efficiency in Pakistan is examined in Section II. The possibility 
that privatised firms may be inefficient at equilibrium levels unless regulated and an 
efficient regulation framework is examined in Section III. Main conclusions are 
summarised in Section IV. 
 
II.  THE IMPACT OF PRIVATISATION ON EFFICIENCY 
The impact of privatisation on levels of efficiency has been examined in the 
following through its impact on the growth rate of output, change in prices, and 
return on equity/fixed assets. 
 
Growth of Output 
With a view to examining the impact of privatisation on changes in the 
growth of output, analysis of variance was carried out to test if the growth rate of 
output in the privatised industrial sector in pre-privatisation and post privatisation 
period were different. Pakistani data do not allow us to reject the null hypothesis that 
there is no difference in the growth rate of output.1 It suggests that privatisation has 
left the efficiency of the manufacturing industries unchanged. 
It is quite well-known that the monopolist would try to maximise its profits by 
restricting the output and increasing the prices unless through public intervention he 
is not allowed to exploit the monopolistic power. Accordingly, privatisation may 
even lead to lower levels of efficiency. Whether privatisation has led to an increase 
or a decline in the growth rate of privatised industries, growth rate of output in the 
post privatised period of the industrial sectors in which at least some industrial units 
have been privatised is regressed against the growth rate of the same industry prior 
to privatisation, market concentration and/or level of protection. Accordingly the 
following relationship has been estimated. 
 PRI = a + b Pub + c Con + d PRO 
1The F-ratio turns out to be only 1.33.
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where: 
 PRI = Growth rate of production after privatisation. 
 PUB = Growth rate of production prior to privatisation. 
 CON = Concentration ratio. 
 PRO = Protection provided to the industry. 
 
Since privatisation is expected to increase the growth rate, a priori, b >1. 
Since concentration in the sellers market allows an industry to exploit the monopoly 
power, c < 0. While there are a number of concentration measures such as four firm 
concentration, Heifindhal Index etc., but they are not available after 1967-68 for 
Pakistan and as such we have been constrained to use number of firms as a measure 
of concentration. Protection tends to promote economic activity and as such growth 
rate of protected industries may be higher. However, if protection remains constant 
over time, then it may act as another measure of concentration. Therefore, d < 0. 
Effective protection rate and nominal protection rates have been alternately used in 
the specification to compute the impact of protection on the growth rates.2 The 
results obtained are as follows: 
 PRI = 1.62 + 0.78 PUB – 0.02 CON – 0.07 EPR + 0.06 NPR 
   (0.29)  (2.08)  (0.13) (1.27) (0.79) 
   R2 = 0.47               DW = 1.45 
 
 PRI = 1.99 + 0.77 PUB + 0.007 CON – 0.046 EPR 
   (0.31)  (2.12)  (0.04)   (–1.018) 
   R2 = 0.42               DW = 1.66 
 
 PRI = 3.24 + 0.57 PUB + 0.102 CON + 0.0067 NPR 
   (.76)    (1.63)  (0.64)    (0.109) 
             R2 = 0.30     DW = 2.41 
 
 PRI = –2.88 + 0.59 PUB + 0.99 CON 
   (1.99)    (1.86)    (0.68) 
              R2 = 0.33    DW = 1.37 
Quite surprisingly these results suggest a significant decline in the growth rate 
after privatisation. However, the decline in this period cannot be ascribed  to just 
privatisation as during this period a general slackness in the economic activity has 
been observed. The growth of GDP and particularly  that of the industrial sector has 
fallen rather significantly. Nevertheless, to some extent decline in the growth rate of 
overall manufacturing sector may have been due to the fact that there has been a 
decline due to privatisation of manufacturing industries. Moreover, as we see in the 
2It is assumed that the protection rates remained the same following the privatisation. 
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following the decline in output has accompanied with an increase in prices suggesting 
that privatisation may  have led to a decision of the monopolist to reduce the output. 
The sign of concentration is correct, but the coefficient is insignificant. 
However, this may be due to the fact that number of firms show very slight variation 
across these industries. Same is true of the protection coefficient. 
 
Changes in Prices 
Probably from consumers’ stand point, the benefit of privatisation must be 
reflected in reduction of real prices of the products of the privatised firms. The fall in 
real prices would also indicate an increase in the levels of efficiency. While the 
prices of the products of privatised firms increased at a rate of 6.1 percent in the pre-
privatisation period as compared to the general inflation rate of 9.3 percent, the 
prices in the post-privatisation period increased by 16.3 percent as compared to the 
general inflation rate of 10.5 percent. This does suggest that producers may have 
been able to exploit their monopoly power. 
 
Changes in Profitability 
Two what extent the net profitability of the privatised firms have increased, 
changes in return on equity and return on fixed assets after privatisation has been 
regressed against returns in pre-privatisation period. 
 
 ROEPR = 17.53 + 0.94 ROEPu 
   (1.11)    (.033) 
   R2 = 0.17     DW = 1.53 
 FAPR = 8.85 – 0.111 FAPu 
   (0.44)   (0.64) 
   R2 = 0.06      DW = 1.53 
 
Where ROE is return on equity 
 FA is return on fixed assets 
 subscripts PR and Pu refer to after and before privatisation. 
 
The coefficient is statistically insignificant implying no change in the return 
on equity and fixed assets as a result of privatisation. 
III.  MONOPOLISTIC MARKET STRUCTURE AND REGULATION 
Let us consider an industry with constant returns to scale and examine its 
behaviour under perfectly competitive and monopolistic market structures. In a 
competitive market structure, prices would equal the marginal cost and in a 
monopolistic situation, prices would exceed marginal cost. Obviously, if private 
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While trade policy may be employed to curb monopolistic exploitation of the 
producers, such a possibility does not exist in case of non-traded activity. No doubt, 
monopolies can be regulated but close regulation of investment and other decision of 
the firms may leave very little room for the producers of the privatised firms to 
improve their levels of efficiency. Tight regulation may even leave the private 
producers worse off compared to the managers of a public enterprise. Unless, there 
is an efficient regulation framework, as has been discussed by Baumol (1996), 
regulation may be detrimental to growth of productivity. 
Baumol lists six regulation mechanisms usually employed to regulate 
privatised firms, and he advises against their use. Firstly, because of the fear of 
monopoly power, the regulators try to inject more competition by mere introduction 
of  additional  firms  into  market  which  is  no  guarantee  for  effective 
competition, especially when the scale economies are significant. Second, cross 
subsidies are generally maintained and they drive far out of line the prices which 
economic efficiency requires. Third, regulators sometimes impose exclusive 
territories for different competitors as has been done in British Telecom where the 
territories has been spelt out which tend to increase cost and lower the level of 
efficiency. Fourth, the regulated firms face the danger of inconsistency in the 
regulators’ policy which may not be foreseen by the management. Fifth, regulation 
may cause delays and the producers may not be able to quickly take the decisions in 
accordance with the market conditions. Sixth the privatised firms are regulated 
through accounting conventions such as fully distributed cost which generally are 
arbitrary. Since this boils down generally to cost plus formula for prices, it 
eliminates any incentives for reducing the cost. As is quite well-known economic 
regulation is to facilitate and encourage effective competition where it is feasible and 
provide an effective substitute for competition where it is not possible. The regulator 
has to supply a substitute for enforcing effective competition. 
Where the scale economies are significant, multiplicity of firms will probably 
neither be feasible nor desirable and marginal costs pricing will be incompatible with 
solvency of the firms. Accordingly, the concept of “perfect contestability, defined as 
the state of a market in which there is totally costless and an unimpeded freedom of 
entry and exist must serve the model.” Accordingly, Baumol outlines the following 
seven rules of economic regulation. 
 1. Where there is evidence of competition, regulators should refrain from 
intervention. 
 2. Where completion can be stimulated, it must be done. 
 3. The regulators should make sure that prices in the long run do not exceed 
the levels which in a perfectly competitive market would make entry 
profitable. 
 4. Prices should not be permitted to go below the level which is viable for any 
substantial period in a competitive or contestable market, i.e. prices should 
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not fall short of the marginal cost of any product or the per unit incremental 
cost of the entire output of any homogenous product. 
 5. Because in a contestable market one may encounter prices close to the 
stand-alone cost ceiling or the marginal-average cost floor, the firm should 
be left free to adopt any price within these limits. 
 6. Price caps should substitute for fixed ceilings on total earnings or for a 
fixed ceiling on rate of return on investment. 
 7. When inputs are supplied by a regulated firm, both to itself as a component 
of one of its final product, and to a competitor producer, the regulated firms 
should charge the rival the same price for that input that the former 
implicitly charges to itself. 
IV.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
While divestiture policy of Pakistan has been quite successful in the sense 
that 86 manufacturing units, two commercial banks, and one development financial 
institution, ten percent of the shares of PIA, and about 12.0 percent of telecom 
shares etc., have already been divested, it has not helped in raising the level of 
efficiency. Privatisation would increase the efficiency of the privatised units only if 
it took place in a competitive market structure. The evidence on growth of output 
and change in prices in the activities so far privatised show that the producers have 
been able to exercise their monopoly power. Growth rates of output may have fallen 
and prices have increased. Rate of return on equity and fixed assets seem to have 
remained constant. These results are not very encouraging for privatisation; if 
monopolistic practices have prevailed even in the industries which produce tradable 
goods, the privatisation of non-traded activities would definitely result into 
monopolistic exploitation. 
Regulation of industry to force a competitive solution on the monopolist is 
generally taken as an optimum solution alongwith privatisation. However, if 
regulation implies that it creates uncertainty for the producers and the producers 
have even lower flexibility in decision-making even as compared to public sector 
enterprises, it may be counter productive. 
Since perfect competition model may result into solvency problems, it needs 
to be substituted with perfect contestability model which allows the firms to make 
sufficient profits and leave it quite free to take decisions. Probably price caps 
alongwith productivity and general inflation rate can be categorised as efficient 
intervention. 
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